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STUCK IN THE MIDDLE REWSITED: THE CASE OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY

Isabelle Dostaler and Triant Flouris

Abstract
When Porter (1980) introduced his typology of business strategies, he used Laker Airways' as an example to illustrate
the danger of being stuck in the middle between the two basic types of competitive advantage, namely low cost and
differentiation. However, the changing nature of competitive pressure in many business sectors and the accompanying
need to perform well simultaneously in several aspects of operations performance, have eventually lead Porter (1990)
to revisit his early idea. When presenting Porter's generic competitive strategies, most strategy textbooks now offer
a new choice, namely the "integrated cost leadershiptdifferentiation" strategy (Coulter, 2002; Hitt, Ireland, &
Hoskisson, 2003), or the "best-cost provider" strategy (Thompson & Strickland, 2001). Given this background, the
purpose of this theoretical paper is to build upon the strategic management and operations strategy literature to
develop a conceptual framework that will subsequently be used to explore the extent that airline companies
successfully pursue the best-cost provider (or integrated cost leadershiptdifferentiation) strategy, and how they manage
to resolve the trade-off between low-cost and differentiation. We aim at revisiting the "stuck in the middle"
prescription by demonstrating that a number of aviation strategic options exist between the ''traditional'' and "lowcost" model.

lntroduction

In many industrial sectors, competitive pressure now
requires companies to compete on several dimensions
simultaneously. Rather than choosing between an ensemble
of key performance criteria, companies should aim at
achievingthem all. Indeed, fiom a customer's point of view,
the obvious choice would be, for example, audio equipment
offering both performance and ease of use, or cars offering
both speed and safety. Similarly, when given a choice, a
traveller will opt for a carrier that is able to offer high
service quality, on-time arrival, and low fares. These
examples illustrate the perspective that argues against
Porter's "stuck in the middle7' prescription that inherent
contradictions exist between the generic competitive
strategies, namely the cost-leadership, cost-focus,
differentiation, and focused differentiationstrategies. This
critique was echoed in the field of operations management
where the traditional idea that the operationsfunction should
be designed to achieve a limited number of performance
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criteria, for example low-cost vs. flexibility, has been
questioned.
The purpose of this theoretical paper is to build on the
strategic management and operations strategy literature to
develop a conceptual h e w o r k that will subsequently be
used to explore the extent that airline companies will
successfullypursue the best-cost provider (or integrated cost
leadershipldifferentiation)strategy and how they manage to
resolve the trade-off between low-cost and differentiation.
Theoretical Background
Generic Competitive Strategies

Strategy can be formally envisioned as a hierarchy
reflecting the organizational structure of multidivisional
corporations(Grant, 1998) in which corporatestrategy states
the general direction that the organization will follow, while
business strategy is a formulation of how the business unit
intends to compete in its given business sector. The lower
level of this hierarchy of plans reveals the instrumental
character of functional strategies designed to support the
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implementation of the business and corporate strategies.
Strategists or dominant coalitions have a number of
corporate strategic options such as concentration, vertical or
horizontal integration, and diversification available to them,
that can be realized through strategic alliances, mergers,
acquisitions, or internal development.
Whereas the business sectors in which the fm will be
active are selected at the corporate strategy level, business
strategy decisions dictate how each business unit will
compete in its specific business sector. In an attempt to
explain and categorize specific com~etitivestrategies that
firms use, researchers have proposed typologies of business
strategy. According to Miles and Snow (1978), four

strategic postures are possible: prospector, defender,
analyser, and reactor. Porter (1980) argued that two types of
competitive advantage exist that can be combined with
either a broad or limited competitive scope to create four
well-known business strategies: cost leadership,
differentiation,focused low-cost, and focused differentiation
(Figure 1). After identifiing an industry that is considered
to be attractive, a firm will determine how to position itself
within the industry. This explains why Mintzberg classified
Porter's contribution in the "positioning" school of thought
(Mintzberg, 1998).

Competitive Advantage

Competitive

Lower Cost

Differentiation

Broad
Target

Cost Leadership

Differentiation

Narrow
Target

Cost Focus

Focused Differentiation

Scope

Figure I. Four competitive strategies
(Source: Porter, 1980).
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Cost leadership is the typical business strategy pursued
by companies in the consumer electronics or compact cars
industries. Each one of the cost leader's value chain
activities has to be conducted in the most efficient way in
order to generate a profit margin despite the low price of the
product or service offered. In contrast, differentiation is the
business strategy of companies that offer a product or
service that customers perceive as different and for which
they are willing to pay a higher price. Selectingthe bases of
differentiation, in other words the features of the product or
service offered or the way in which it is offered, and
developing the organizationalcapabilitiesneeded to achieve
the bases of differentiation, is a key challenge for
companies. Interestingly, in order to ensure offering
acceptable value to customers, cost leaders must not ignore
the bases of differentiation valued by customers and for
which they are willing to pay a premium. However, cost
leaders must not try to offer features that differentiated
products or services possess, for fear of being "stuck in the
k ~Porter (l980), this is what happened
middle". ~ c c o r d to
to Laker Airways in the 1970s. The British airline offered a
successful no fiilVlow fare service but eventually started to
add more destinations and fancier in-flight services. To
maintain it. profitability, Laker Airways had to raise its
fares up to the point where travellers felt that they had more
value for money when flying with traditional carriers.
According to Porter, a firm that tries to pursue each generic
strategy but fails to achieve any of them is 'stuck in the
middle'. Porter (1990) saw such a position as "a
manifestation of a furn's unwillingness to make choices
about how to compete," @. 69) and argued that being stuck
in the middle was "a recipe for strategic mediocrity and
below-average performance, because pursuing all the
strategies simultaneously means that a fm is not able to
achieve any of them because of their inherent
contradictions" (Porter, 1990, p.40). More precisely,
achieving both low cost and differentiation was thought to
be "difficultbecause providing unique performance, quality,
or service is inherently more costly, in most instances, to
seeking only to be comparable to competitors on such
attributes" (Porter, 1990, p.38).
Operations Strategy
The above discussion on generic competitive strategies
seemed to imply that when formulating a business strategy,
managers may choose from a "menu" of generic options.
The literature on functional strategies is less centred around
content and is therefore keeping with the Harvard approach
to business policy that considers each company's situation
as unique (Greiner, Bhambri, & Curnmings, 2003).
Combined to form what is fashionably referred to as a

"business model", functional strategies are often defined as
"patterns of decisions" (Wheelwright, 1984, p.79), putting
in action the formulated corporate and business strategies.
Marketing strategy, human resource strategy, research and
development strategy, and operations strategy are examples
of functional strategies. A human resource strategy will
consist of a set of decisions regarding staffing, training,
compensation, performance appraisal, etc. An airline
operations strategy could include decisions regarding
service design, demand forecasting, capacity management,
service operations, planning schedule, and service quality
management. Mintzberg (1987) has distinguished between
intended and realized strategies, explaining that a
company's actual strategies are a combination of intended
and emergent strategies. Not all intentions are realized
because some are discarded within the course of action.
Since they are defined as decisions already taken, it could be
argued that functional strategies go beyond strategic intent
(Hamel & Prahalad, 1989) and are good indicators of a
firm's realized business strategy.
The field of operations strategy was dominated by the
trade-off model for a long time; The operations function
should not try to be all things to all people and the
functional decisions described above (capacity, equipment
and processes, etc.) should be taken with a limited set of
criteria in mind (Skinner, 1969). As a result, a factory or
service delivery system, designed to achieve low cost, could
not be flexible and lower quality could also be expected.
The operations function should select one or two
competitive priorities and develop manufacturingor service
capabilities accordingly in order to support the choice
between a cost and a differentiation strategy made at the
business level. Indeed, the trade-off model is quite in line
with Porter's "stuck in the middle" argument presented
above. Now that the changing nature of the competitive
pressure in many industrial sectors, and the accompanying
need to perform well in several aspects of operations
performance have become a global reality, some operations
management authors have suggested adopting a cumulative
viewpoint of operational performance (Ferdows & De
Meyer, 1990). Interestingly, this has happened in a context
where scholars in the field of strategic management were
questioning the exclusivity of low cost and differentiation
(Kotha & Vadlamani, 1995; Hayes & Pisano, 1996).
Ferdows and De Meyer's "sand cone model" is
increasingly referred to as the first formal proposition of an
alternative to the trade-off theory. Most authors in the field
now recognize the trade-off model and the "cumulative" or
"synergies" approach as two competing schools of thought
(Corbett & Wassenhove, 1993; Noble 1995; Clark, 1996;

-
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Collins, Cordon & Julien, 1998; Flynn, Schroeder & Flynn,
1999; Dostaler 2000). The notions of "sequence" and
"lasting capabilities" are key elements in Ferdows and De
Meyer's model which is illustrated by a sand cone; pouring
sand to build a cone is like putting in managerial effort and
resources. The authors argue that since improvements in
quality precede successive improvements in dependability,
speed of response, and, in the end, cost, all these
improvements (or lasting capabilities) can last (Figure 2).
Research conducted by others has confirmed this view of
quality as being the basis of improvements in other
performanceareas (Noble, 1995; Flyhn et al., 1999;Dostaler
2000). However, as empirical evidence is scant for the
remaining stages of the proposed sequence of
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improvements, one cannot but wonder if such a sequence
really exists. It could be argued that improvements happen
in a more disorganized manner, with various virtuous
circles, and some vicious ones, at work, everywhere in the
production or service delivery system. For example, the
implementation of JIT in manufacturing companies may
lead to improvementsin quality because solutions to quality
problems that appear suddenly must be found (Wilbson &
Oliver, 1989). Similarly, improvements in quality also
increase productivity as less re-work is needed. The idea of
the multiple impact of a given practice is hardly debatable.
However, the hypothesis of a fixed sequence of
improvements may be less convincing.
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"Stuck in the Middle" Revisited
The "stuck in the middle" prescription, like the trade-off
model, has generated much debate. We mentioned earlier
that functional strategies are instrumental in character since
they are designed to support the implementation of business
and corporate strategies. Using Mintzberg's (1987) concept
of realized and intended strategies, we suggested that
fhctional strategies constitute valid indicators of the actual
business strategy pursued by a firm.The similarity between
the debates on the trade-off model in the field of operations
management and on the stuck in the middle prescription in
the field of strategy is a further indication of the close
relationships between levels of strategies. For example,
Gilbert and Strebel (1988) did not consider cost leadership
and differentiation as mutually exclusive and argued that
companies in mature industries can rejuvenate themselves
by shifting to product differentiation and innovation, whilst
preserving strengths in cost reduction and process
efficiency. Interestingly, this is reminiscent of Ferdows and
De eyer's idea of lasting capabilities that pushed the
operations management field to question the inescapability
of operational performance trade-offs. Similar arguments
could be found with Pettigrew and Whipp who observedthat
in many industrial sectors, bases of competition in one era
became the essential prerequisites for new organizational
capabilities in the next. They stated that "the popular notion
of a single competitive edge appears at best wrong-headed
and at worst downrightalarming" and stressed the danger of
"pinning all hopes and resources on one main ability"
(Pettigrew & Whipp,l991, p.289). This strong argument
echoed the "value for money" paradigm introduced by
Pitelis and Taylor (1996) who are considered as fervent
advocates of the need for companies to try to achieve both
cost leadership and differentiation (Kanitakis, 2002).
Contributingto the debate on whether cost leadership and
differentiation can be combined, Cronshaw, Davis and Kay
(1 994) have proposed new interpretations of the "stuck in
the middle" prescription. They suggested that f m s that do
not establish lower costs or better or differentiated products,
overall rarely succeed. Interestingly, this interpretation
suggested that "stuck in the middle" was less a prescription
than a way to analyze strategic outcomes. Indeed, analyzing
strategic outcomes is precisely what Porter does in his 1990
book The Competitive Advantage of Nations when he used
the global shipbuilding industry to describe the generic
strategies. He explained how Japan, Korea, Scandinavia,
and China each have successfully pursued one of the four
competitive strategies and argued that Spanish and British
ship-building industries have declined because they were
stuck in the middle (Porter, 1990, p.39). Interestingly,
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Cronshaw et al. argued in 1994 that the weaknesses of
British yards "were in the implementation of the strategy":
British shipbuildersfailed not because they
pursued the wrong strategy, but because
they were not very good at building ships.
In this context, the claim that they were
'stuck in the middle' is best interpreted as
meaning that they did not succeed in
establishing any competitive advantage.
We infer that they were 'stuck in the
middle' lkom the evidence of their failure.
In this case, we would not interpret the
phrase 'stuck in the middle' as refening to
strategies, intentions or goals, .but to
strategic outcomes. (pp.22-23).
The "stuck in the middle" prescription should, therefore, not
be taken literally. As mentioned earlier, Porter insisted on
pointing out the danger for a low-cost producer of not
offering acceptable quality and service as well as the danger
for a differentiator of having costs higher than its price
premium. Moreover, Porter's discussion about the
sustainability of the competitive advantage is puzzling. The
author claimed that whether a finn will be able to sustain its
advantage depends on the source of the advantage, the
number of distinct sources, and constant improvement and
upgrading (Porter, 1990, pp.49-53). Porter made a
distinction between lower-order advantages, such as low
labor costs or cheap raw material, and higher-order
advantages such as proprietary process technology or
product differentiation based on unique products or services,
arguing that pure cost advantages are often less sustainable
than differentiation. In a sense, the author appeared to treat
cost leadership like the poor cousin in the competitive
strategy family. The underlying message seemed to be that
differentiation is the best strategy. In keeping with
Cronshaw et al. (1994)' it could be argued that being able to
successfully combine differentiation and cost leadership
would be even better. Therefore, it is not surprising that
most strategy textbooks now offer a fifth choice (Figure 3),
namely the "integrated cost leadershipldifferentiation
strategy" (Coulter, 2002; Hitt et al., 2003) or the "best-cost
provider strategy" (Thompson & Strickland, 2001)' a
strategy "in which an organization develops a competitive
advantage by simultaneously achieving low costs and high
levels of differentiation (Coulter, 2002, p.228). Interestingly,
while Southwest is widely recognized for having invented
the low-cost carrier business model, Hitt et al. (2003) argued
in the opening of their textbook that Southwest succeeded
JAAER, Winter 2006
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despite poor economic conditions "because of its integrated
cost leadershipldifferentiationstrategy" (p.6). The authors
observed that Southwest offered low fares, like many other
carriers, but also had fewer customer complaintsthan major
carriers, were able to attract employees that treated

customers well and had excellent on-time performance.
Southwest therefore appearedto simultaneouslyachieve low
costs and differentiation.

Competitive Advantage
Lower Cost

Differentiation

Cost Leadership

Differentiation

k

Competitive

Broad
Target

Integrated Cost
Leadership1
Differentiation

Scope

Narrow
Target

Cost Focus

Focused Differentiation

Figure 3. Five competitive strategies

(Source: Coulter, 2002)
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Conceptual Framework
Given this background, this paper sets out to propose a
conceptual framework that could be used to explore the
extent to which airline companies successfully pursue the
best-cost p r o v i d e r ( o r i n t e g r a t e d c o s t
leadershipldifferentiation)strategy described above and how
they manage to resolve the trade-off between low-cost and
differentiation.
While cost leadership is self-explanatory - in the airline
industry it translates into offering the lowest fares - the very
concept of differentiation is much less precise.
Differentiators need to be aware of @he key success factors
in their industry, namely "the product attributes,
competencies, competitive capabilities, and market
achievements with the greatest direct bearing on company
profitability" (Thompson & Strickland, 2001, p. 106) - in
other words the bases on which customers choose between
competing airlines - and select the key success factors that
they will use as bases for differentiation. In the case of the
airline ihdustry, key success factors that carriers could use
as bases of differentiation are in-flight comfort service,
baggage handling, quality of airline employees, internet
usage, airport proximity, additional services, number of
destinationsoffered, and safety. Therefore, carrierspursuing
a best-cost provider (or integrated cost
leadershipldifferentiation) strategy would offer lower fares
than their competitors, together with higher quality air
travel services.
We are also interested in assessing the success of the
business strategy. In order to do so , we will look at both
fmancial and strategic performance. While fmancial
performance translates into indicators such as profitability
and stock price, strategic performance refers to the strength
of a company business position reflected in the size of its
market share and the power of its brand. We posit that:
(1) Airlines that offer lower fares than their
competitors, together with higher quality air travel
services and achieve higher financial and strategic
performance than their rivals have successfully
implemented the best-cost provider (or integrated
cost leadershipldifferentiation) strategy.
(2) Airlines that offer lower fares than their
competitors, together with higher quality air travel
services but achieve lower financial and strategic
performance than their rivals are stuck in the
middle.
We now turn to the interesting question of how airlines can
manage to successfUlly pursue the best-cost provider (or
integrated cost leadershipldifferentiation) strategy. This
translates into operations management terms on how the
Page 40
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trade-offs between low cost and high quality can be
resolved. Moreover, according to the sand cone model
reviewed earlier, operational performance trade-offs can be
avoidedby developinglastingcapabilities.Discoveringhigh
performance, low costldifferentiation, carriers' capabilities
and competencies would therefore lead us to answer the
second research question. It should be noted we do not make
any a prior assumptions about the factors explaining
successful achievement of the best-cost provider (or
integrated cost leadershipldifferentiation) strategy. Indeed,
as will be explained later on, our research design will allow
us to compare, in an open-ended manner, the cases of
airlines pursuing different business strategies and achieving
different levels of frnancial and business performance. We
hope to demonstrate that a number of aviation strategic
options exist between the "traditional" and "low cost"
models.
Research Design
In keeping with the above research m e w o r k , our
proposed research design would first entail the identification
of the business strategy that carriers actually pursue. As
mentioned earlier, the typology of competitive strategies
introduced by Porter can be used to compare how rivals in
a given industrial sector position themselves. It would
therefore be relevant to apply this tool to understand the
positioning of a sample of airline camers competing on the
same routes (some could be traditional carriers and others
could be so-called low cost carriers). Selecting airlines
competing on same routes controls for travel distance.
Indeed, it can be argued that what customers value depends
considerably on the length of the flight.
After establishing a sample of airlines, objective
measurement of costs and levels of differentiation will be
taken. While airline fares can be used as indicators to the
extent in which airlines are using low cost as a competitive
advantage, the level of differentiation can be measured using
indicators such as safety, in-flight services, and on-time
arrivals. We can choose to concentrate on a single indicator
of differentiation or create an index using various bases of
differentiation. Published information on carrier
performance can be used to evaluate the level of
differentiation. Alternatively, direct measurement of
customers' evaluationof airline safety, and in-flight services
can be taken, by conducting a survey of passengers
travelling with the selected airlines. This approach, used by
Kanitakis(2002), entails approaching passengers at the back
of the check-in desks queue and interviewing them using a
questionnaire designed to rate the auline on a number of
differentiationindicators. In keeping with Porter's typology
of business strategies, this approach allows for the
JAAER, Winter 2006
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identification of whether or not carriers offer air travel
services that passengers value and for which they would be
willing to pay a premium. Moreover, measuring the fares
offered by the airlines will indicate whether passengers feel
that they are being offered value without having to pay a
premium. According to our conceptual m e w o r k , this
beans travelling with an airline pursuing a bestcost
provider (or integrated cost leadershipldifferentiation)
strategy.
The expected results of the above measurement will be
plotted on a scattergram (Figure 4), composed of the
following q u h t s : a group of airlines pursuing a cost
leadership strategy, a group of airlines pursuiog a
differentiation strategy, a group of airlines pursuing a best-

Low I

cost provider (or integrated cost leadershipldifferentiation)
strategy and, finally, a group unable to achieve either low
cost or differentiation. In comparing airlines' positioningon
low cost and differentiation, we are making an implicit
diitinction between intended and realized business
strategies. The intended business strategy could take the
form of airline companies' statements regarding their
positioning, in their annual report or in the business press.
However, beyond strategic intent, the measurement of fsres
and airline services quality that we plan to conduct will give
a measm of the extent to which the intended business
strategy was realized.

I

I
Airlines pursuing a cost
leadership strategy

Airlines pursuing an
integStrategy
(Some potentkI& stuck
in themiddle)

Airlines unable to
achieve either a cost
leadership or a
differentiafrafron
strategy

Airlines pursuing a
dmmtiation strategy

High
Fares

Low Service Level

High Service Level

Figure 4. Airlines r e a l i d business strategies
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In the next step of our analysis, we are going to
concentrate on airlines located in the integrated cost
leadershipldifferentiation quadrant of our scattergram.
Depending on whether or not all airlines in the research
sample are public companies, indicators such as profit
margins, stock price and return on investment will be used
to evaluate financial performance. Strategic performance
will be measured with indicators such as market share and
capacity utilization. In line with our conceptual b e w o r k ,
measuring financial and strategic performance will allow us
to distinguish between airlines successfully pursuing the
b e s t - c o s t p r o v i d e r ( o r imtegrated c o s t
leadershipldifferentiation) strategy, airlinesthat are stuck in
the middle and do not fare better that those located in the
bottom left quadrant of the Realized Business Strategies
Scattergram.
In order to determine how airlines can manage to
successfullypursue the best-cost provider (or integrated cost
leadershipldifferentiation)strategy, secondary data will be
collected to compare airlines having successfully
implemented the best-cost provider strategy and with
airlines appearing to be stuck in the middle. In keeping with
theory on operations strategy, the aim of this comparison is
to identify airlines' "lasting capabilities" (Ferdows & De
Meyer, 1990) by analyzing business press articles and
published case studies to assess how primary and support
activities are conducted by each airline. This follows from
Porter's (1985) assertion that a network of discrete activities
underlies any competitive advantage (p. 1991). It is also in
line with the resource-based view of the firm (Barney, 1991)
which highlights the influence of organizational assets and
capabilities, that are difficult to copy, in the creation of finn
specific rents.
Conclusion
This paper builds on the strategic management and
operations strategy literature to develop a conceptual
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m e w o r k that could be used to explore the extent to which
airline companies successfully pursue the best-cost provider
(or integrated cost leadershipldifferentiation) strategy, and
how they manage to resolve the trade-off between low-cost
and differentiation. Although a lot of work remains to be
done to operationalize our hmework and apply it to the
airline industry, we believe that our approach could lead us
to challenge the current dichotomy between so-called
traditional and low cost carriers. We argue that it is only
through objectivecomparison and positioning that definitive
conclusions can be reached on the business strategies
actually pursued by airlines competing on similar routes.
Moreover, we believe that using an open-ended approach to
understand how carriers operate, instead of trying to
measure whether or not they are using the well-known low
cost recipe, could lead to interesting discoveries.
The results of this objective comparison of airlines'
performance and activities will be most valuable, given that
the airline industry is currently searching for new strategic
avenues. Many so-called traditional camers have chosen to
create low-cost subsidiaries to try to compete with newly
established low cost carriers. However, this strategy has not
been successfbl and seems to further demonstrate the
soundness of the "stuck in the middle" argument.
Interestingly, the difficulty for traditional carriers to house
low-cost subsidiaries questions the sequence of
improvement (from quality to dependability to speed to cost
efficiency) introduced by Ferdows and De Meyer (1 990) in
their sand cone model. Our proposed research could lead us
to identifLing a sequence of improvements specific to an
airline. Perhaps it is more feasible to move away from a cost
leadership to an integrated cost leadershipldifferentiation
position than the other way around, which would mean
succeeding where Laker Airways had failed a number of
years ago. .)
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